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Abstract
The modern vehicle requires connectivity in order to enable and enhance comfort and conve-
nience features so desired by customers. This connectivity however also allows the possibility
that an external attacker may compromise the security (and therefore the safety) of the ve-
hicle. In order to answer this problem, we propose a framework for a systematic method of
security testing for automotive Bluetooth interfaces and implement a proof-of-concept tool
to carry out testing on vehicles using this framework. From our ﬁndings, we conclude that
the method enabled us to enumerate multiple weaknesses and that by continuing to extend
the work, we would discover more.
Keywords: automotive security, operational and ﬁeld testing, threat model, wireless
security, Bluetooth
1. Introduction
The modern vehicular system is opening up, with wireless interfaces and services imple-
mented for customer comfort and convenience. The introduction of these interfaces means
that malicious external inﬂuences are now possible, as demonstrated by seminal experimental
analyses on individual vehicles [11, 29, 38]. These inﬂuences can be construed as “cyberat-
tacks” or “hacks”, which have come to mean an attempt to manipulate an insecure system
to cause negative consequences such as harm, damage or destruction. In cyber-physical sys-
tems - deﬁned as a system where computational and physical processes are integrated [30] -
the harm may not be limited to logical assets (such as personal data theft or loss) but could
conceivably also cause physical harm, such as is the case with a vehicle. Protection and
defence mechanisms are therefore necessary in order to mitigate or nullify the consequences
of an attack. Several challenges stand in the way of implementation although experimental
analyses on a vehicle’s possible entry points have been performed. The primary concern here
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is that the placement and details of countermeasures requires knowledge as to where, in the
system, security vulnerabilities or weaknesses exist in the ﬁrst place, and what its nature is.
Bluetooth is a pervasive interface and was therefore chosen for this study because of
the potential negative impact should it be compromised. There have been estimates that
vehicles with a Bluetooth interface number at nearly nine million currently, with a forecast of
21 million vehicles to have Bluetooth by 2018 [19]. Market growth for information systems,
of which Bluetooth is a major enabler, is anticipated to grow to $1.6 billion by 2020, with at
least a 40% rise in automotive wireless technology [2]. Bluetooth is a low power, short range
wireless communication technology, capable of forming ad-hoc networks. Security issues
with this technology are well documented [15].
The main contribution of the paper is a systematic method of evaluating the security
of the automotive Bluetooth interface, something that has not yet been performed. This is
needed to maximise the eﬀectiveness of the security evaluation and is implemented through a
proof-of-concept tool based on attack tree modelling and penetration testing methods. This
tool was then used to evaluate the Bluetooth interface on a range of built-in automotive
infotainment systems.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses related work, whilst
Section 3 looks at Bluetooth security, both generally and speciﬁc to the automotive domain.
We describe our methodology in Section 4 and present our proof-of-concept tool develop-
ment and validation in Section 5. We discuss our ﬁndings in Section 6 and consider future
directions in Section 7.
2. Related work
There are several challenges with securing wireless interfaces in vehicles. Any security
mechanism will require additional processing overhead, and on the hardware level, has ram-
iﬁcations in provision of energy and in physical assembly and design, such as placement
of additional wiring. Even should such concerns be addressed, well-established defences at
software level such as the use of cryptography, ﬁrewalls and intrusion detection systems
(IDS) cannot be implemented without considerable change in architecture due to the use
of suﬃciently diﬀerent protocols and topologies within the automotive domain. Even post-
release, patches, unless performed over-the-air, for discovered vulnerabilities are diﬃcult to
apply once units are sold.
All of the above is dependent on acquiring knowledge and information regarding existing
vulnerabilities and holds true not just of Bluetooth attacks, but also generally. Some exploits
have already been demonstrated in literature on the vehicle as a whole [11, 29] or on various
subsystems [22, 42, 46, 51, 52], some are reported through “hacker” conferences such as
Black Hat [38] whilst still others can be inferred through technological trends.
Although these papers show an impressive range of experimentation and an in-depth
knowledge of the target system, they have not mapped out a process or taxonomised their
ﬁndings. Furthermore, information on the practical aspect of security testing is scarce;
because automotive systems are complex with many diﬀerent technologies integrated into
the single vehicle, many papers dealing with experimental analysis by necessity limit their
2
scope to a single interface, protocol or technology which are extremely diverse in nature.
Of the papers that involve practical security analysis on vehicles, only one details attacks
on an automotive system (at a high level) via Bluetooth [11], although many agree that
Bluetooth is a viable entry point for an attacker [42, 56, 14, 36, 22, 25]. Despite the paucity
of information, from the number and variety of reported threats, vulnerabilities and exploits,
it is clear that a systematic description of the problem is required.
A systematic security evaluation method has many advantages. There is a disparity
between what an attacker must ﬁnd in order to exploit the system (potentially just one
vulnerability) and the number of ﬂaws a defender would have to safeguard in order to
protect the system (as many as possible). An ad-hoc approach to ﬁnding vulnerabilities
- which by implication means a subjective prioritisation of what and where to test [32] -
potentially results in ﬂaws being overlooked. A methodical approach increases the likelihood
of determining ﬂaws, thereby mitigating this problem [48]. Systematic analyses can also be
supported by a variety of tools and utilities, for example, through the use of graph-based
modelling, and in this case also means that, not only is the ﬁnal result documented, but all
the details that led to the system compromise [13].
Systematic evaluations have been described in model-based testing studies such as [34]
and security speciﬁc model-based testing [48] is an active ﬁeld of research. These have
inspired our method of systematism, in particular the use of attack trees. However, although
this approach provides rigour and conﬁdence, we have no trustworthy model from which to
generate tests. This is because the Bluetooth speciﬁcation is embedded in other systems
(such as the embedded system’s operating system and other ﬁrmware) for which we would
need to include to provide a complete model representation of the implementation and for
which there is very little information. Furthermore, whilst model-based security testing may
provide coverage of security weaknesses in a system, applications thereof (e.g. [23]) have
required that models be available or pre-built in order to formally examine. The barrier to
using such methods is as above, that the information required to do so is not available, both
due to commercial conﬁdentiality and the obscurity of subcomponents within the system
(many of which are third party). This also procludes other methods of enabling systematic
evaluation such as attack graphs, for which formal model checking could be performed.
Automotive speciﬁc systematic methods of evaluation are described in the “E-safety ve-
hicle intrusion protected applications” (EVITA) project [17]. The EVITA project ultimately
aims to provide a secure architecture for automotive on-board networks and evaluates the
realisation of this using two “views” the ﬁrst of which is a magniﬁed view. Attack tree
modelling (discussed further in Section 4.2) is used to support these processes, although the
end goal of verifying whether assets are really protected somewhat diﬀers from the aim of
this paper which is to identify unprotected assets through a methodical evaluation. The sec-
ond view, called a compositional view, deals with looking at attack categories (and related
security guarantees) to ensure that omitted attacks are minimised. The latter is a valuable
exercise, however, where a system already exists with unknown properties (and therefore
unknown guarantees) as is the case with this paper, the ability to analyse coverage in such
a way is limited. Methodical evaluation methods are also presented in the J3061 Cyberse-
curity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems [47], drawing from EVITA, although
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information provided has been examples thereof rather than application to a system.
3. Bluetooth
Bluetooth is more complex than most wireless standards, due in part to the Frequency
Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) mechanism designed to reduce narrowband interference.
Channel hopping occurs once every 625 μs and in some cases also uses Adaptive Frequency
Hopping (AFH), whereby channels that can cause interference are avoided [8]. Data whiten-
ing is also performed by XOR-ing each packet with a pseudorandom sequence, in order to
facilitate signal transmission.
Adding to the complexity is also the fact that not all Bluetooth implementations are
identical; Bluetooth standards specify various service proﬁles that could be used in order
to customise the technology, whether that be to enable “hands-free” communication, allow
ﬁle transfers or grant access to phonebooks and messages [4]. Proﬁles consist of information
regarding dependencies, user interface details and speciﬁc protocols required by the service.
This information is vital in detailing what the device is capable of doing, and, from an ad-
versary’s point of view, also gives information on potential weaknesses. The vast majority of
services embodied by these proﬁles communicate via the Radio Frequency Communications
(RFCOMM) and Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP) layers and, where
there is an open channel, could be used to send or extract data. The number and nature of
accessible ports on a remote device depend on the services being oﬀered along with whether
a user is paired and connected.
The pairing process, essentially the method by which two or more devices synchronise
their “hops”, is well documented and in the interest of brevity is only outlined here. A
complete introduction may be found in [8]. The pairing process uses one of two mechanisms:
• Legacy pairing: This has been superseded by Simple Secure Pairing (SSP) in the
Bluetooth 2.1 speciﬁcation, although many older platforms still use this mechanism.
The pairing exchange involves the derivation of a link key from the Bluetooth ad-
dress, the PIN and a random number. This link key is then stored locally and used
in subsequent authentication and encryption processes. The primary danger to this
mechanism is the fact that the PIN is the only aspect providing entropy, exacerbated
by the fact that PINs often contain only four decimal digits.
• SSP: There are four association models under the SSP umbrella, these being i) “Out-
of-band” (using non-traditional channels to complete the pairing process), ii) Numeric
comparison (where two devices with screen capabilities both output a number which
the user then conﬁrms as identical), iii) Passkey entry (where one device displays
a PIN, which is then keyed into another device) and iv) Just Works (where both
devices have no input or output capabilities and pairing takes place without any further
authentication.
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3.1. Bluetooth vulnerabilities
Table 1: Bluetooth attack classiﬁcation (adapted from [15])
Attack
classiﬁcation
Threats
Surveillance Includes general scans (or war-nibbling), inquiry scans and brute
scans to determine non-discoverable addresses. Manufacturers
can be proﬁled using organisationally unique address bits. Also
includes service enumeration.
Range
extension
Most consumer devices are Class 2, with a range of up to 10
metres. Range can be extended through the use of external di-
rectional antenna or passive radio locators.
Obfuscation Includes spooﬁng or cloning a device name, class, address or
service proﬁle ﬁngerprint. Can serve to further other actions
such as man-in-the-middle attacks.
Fuzzing Injection of arbitrary or malformed data.
Sniﬃng Using Bluetooth narrowband or wideband receivers or tools in
order to dump raw data from a connected Bluetooth interface.
Denial of service (DoS) Flooding with data, or jamming signals to cause applications or
devices to freeze or crash or battery exhaustion.
Malware Infection from malicious programs via Bluetooth interface.
Unauthorised
direct data access
Includes targeting hard-coded default PINs, brute forcing PINs,
targetting vulnerable implementations of APIs, sending com-
mands via covert channels to extract data, or using loopholes
in the object exchange (OBEX) protocols.
Man in the middle
(MITM)
Masquerading as a trustworthy entity, or injecting oneself in the
middle of a communication in order to eavesdrop on or modify
data, as described by [20].
There are many categories of attacks that could be performed. These are summarised
in Table 1. The trends abstracted from the speciﬁc techniques play an important part in
identifying the ultimate goals of a potential attacker. These trends can be distilled further
into the categories of data extraction, data manipulation and denial of service. The data
extraction goal, as a proof-of-concept, forms the basis for the attack tree presented in this
paper.
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3.2. Automotive Bluetooth
The wireless nature of Bluetooth has been attractive to automotive manufacturers as a
way of reducing weight and wiring in the vehicle, along with the hands-free services that
Bluetooth can oﬀer. The latter is driven in large part by the advent of regulations barring
the use of mobile phones in vehicles. Its ﬂexibility means that manufacturers can oﬀer
customised features to end users.
Bluetooth implementation on vehicles diﬀers from conventional PC and mobile platforms.
The software on vehicles may not have been updated in years and older chips are in use even
in newer vehicles, with many still using legacy pairing. Presented information is customised
by device and not by users (so no distinction is made between users of the same remote
device) with user information potentially centrally held [45]. Although it has been posited
that requiring user interaction within the authentication process increases security [57] (for
example with numeric comparison), many vehicles use other pairing mechanisms such as
passkey entry (often with a default universal static PIN [15]). The front-end of the system
may not ask for user conﬁrmation or display alerts (such as when an unauthorised device is
trying to pair) as might be expected in other embedded systems.
Additionally, a vehicle is mobile and is rarely stationary with the ignition turned on. This,
combined with a relatively short range of ten meters could pose a challenge to an attacker.
Range extension (see Table 1) however has been used successfully to extend the range
to about a mile, inject audio and eavesdrop on in-cabin conversations [41]. Furthermore,
compromise could also occur pre-travel (for example in a carpark or a garage) for possible
disruption later on.
The majority of built-in infotainment systems either search for a device to pair with or
require a user to actively enable Bluetooth [42], though the seeming security of the latter is
diminished given that not every vehicle limits the time in which the interface is discoverable.
Additionally, many implementations look for previously paired devices and may initiate a
connection without switching on the discoverable mode; potential attackers could also test
for the existence of a device via a name inquiry. An adversary could then wait for the
opportune moment once the existence of a device is known to pair and form a connection
with the target.
4. Methodology
Automotive security is a diverse ﬁeld, with full functional speciﬁcations unlikely to be
readily available due to commercial sensitivity. Combined with the fact that there is little
work to build on (see Section 2), the lack of information necessitates a black box approach.
The methods used in this paper are empirical, and derived from standard practice in
the security industry, namely threat analysis using attack trees, with penetration testing
methods employed to populate these trees. The premise of these methods is founded on
testing a system from an attacker’s point of view to identify system weaknesses and to
reﬂect what an adversary might face in reality.
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4.1. Threat modelling
Threat modelling is the process by which security threats can be determined, analysed
and documented [33]. A threat can be deﬁned as any potential harmful event that could
compromise an asset (an object of value). Combinations of attack vectors and methods are
usually employed in order to realise these threats.
This process typically follows the process of identifying a threat (synonymous in this
case with an attacker goal), which can be broken down into sub-goals iteratively until in-
dividual actions are identiﬁed [33]. Many threat models can broadly be taken to represent
the decision making process of a potential adversary. Popular methods include Microsoft’s
STRIDE (a mnemonic for the threat categories of spooﬁng, tampering, repudiation, infor-
mation disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privilege), DREAD (damage potential,
reproducibility, exploitability, aﬀected users and discoverability) and visualisation tools such
as Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) [33, 31] all of which help to classify, assess the risk of and
visualise the threat landscape. These methods can be used in combination with construc-
tions such as attack trees in order to further enumerate the threat [26], although in these
cases, vulnerabilities have already been identiﬁed in an emulated environment where the
full system is known, which is not the case in this paper. The attack tree (which might be
instead subsumed under a diﬀerent category of vulnerability tree [28]) was used in order to
explore exact paths to the pre-discovered vulnerability [26].
4.2. Attack trees
Many structures exist in order to model security-related testing processes. Examples
include attack nets, which are customised Petri nets with places representing states or modes
of interest, and transitions that represent events such as input or commands [37]. Although
eminently suited to singular activities, such as bringing together seemingly unconnected
ﬂaws to form an individual attack path, representing relationships between diﬀerent attacks
(especially on poorly documented systems) is more challenging [37].
Attack trees were ﬁrst developed to describe the security of systems [49] in a structured
manner and are conceptual diagrams meant to illustrate threats from an attacker’s point of
view. These trees can be represented diagrammatically (Figure 1) or textually (Figure 2).
Attack trees focus on abuse cases (in this case an attack), and even in an informal capacity,
can support threat assessment. This information would usually need to be further formalised,
empiricised or investigated (if resources and available data permits), but is nevertheless a
useful starting point for threat identiﬁcation [43].
Attack trees can be considered analogous to the more common concept of fault trees.
The primary diﬀerence between the two structures can largely be attributed to paradigm.
Where a fault tree looks at random faults that could cause an undesired event, the attack
tree concentrates on intentional malicious actions that could cause the system to enter an
undesired state [6].
Like fault trees, intermediate events (or a branch that can be further developed with leaf
nodes) are connected by logic gates such as AND and OR [49], and where temporal order
is necessary SEQUENTIAL AND (SAND). Where the AND logic gate is used, an attack (a
parent node) is considered complete only when all the steps (child nodes) are completed and
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Figure 1: An example attack tree detailing how to
open a safe [49]
Figure 2: Textual representation of an attack tree
detailing how to open a safe [49]
where necessary in sequence (when SAND is used). With an OR logic gate, achievement of
any one of the steps is adequate to complete the attack. Leaf nodes can be assigned boolean
(such as possible or impossible) or continuous (such as cost) values.
The structure is acyclic, requiring a root (attack goal), and is directional, which is signiﬁ-
cant. From a design perspective, a top-down approach, where an attack goal is ﬁrst identiﬁed
followed by all subsequent methods of achieving the goal, early in the development life-cycle,
is recommended [50]. From a testing perspective, however, this is challenging because of the
black box nature of security testing. Since the system already exists for us, the tree here is
built bottom-up tracing from leaf to root, based on observable entry points and subsequent
behaviours when probed, leading to potential attack goals: the very process that penetra-
tion testing is based on. Note that although the structure is acyclic, the process of security
testing as presented here (requiring multiple iterative test runs) can be considered cyclic.
The sample tree shown in Figure 3 has been developed iteratively. As there are no
real-world measures for detection of security incidents on a vehicle, the primary method
of validation remains domain expert input (such as is the case for building the tree from
bottom up [55]) and data from practical applications; this best practice has been used by
others [7].
4.3. Penetration testing
This form of testing is heavily dependent on the ﬂaw hypothesis approach [37], deﬁned
as a method of identifying deviations from functional speciﬁcations [53]. Testing is then
performed to discover capabilities that can be “exploited to violate some aspect of security
[policies]” [53]. Methods used are usually not prescribed, although some, such as identifying
machine addresses, are more common than others. The ultimate aim is to force the system
into either entering a disallowed state, or executing a disallowed action, thereby exposing
the weakness that allowed such an action.
The result of every action taken in penetration testing can be considered deterministic
based on system implementation, conﬁguration and state [21]. This implies a very large
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(possibly inﬁnite) number of results based on any number of implementation-conﬁguration-
state combinations. The number of combinations also means that test coverage is not easily
quantiﬁed. However, evidence compiled through the testing process can be used to provide
a security assurance case. This is not without its limitations:
• Firstly, proving the complete absence of insecurities in an implementation is not pos-
sible, as tests only ever expose a limited subset of vulnerabilities [18, 16]. It can only
be stated that under certain abuse cases, these ﬂaws were not present and that this is
acceptable security;
• Secondly, a method that does manage to end in exploitation may not be the only
method that does, however, the underlying ﬂaw is exposed and can be addressed for
that particular method. Abstracted patterns of this method can also be extracted (for
example, a buﬀer overﬂow exploit is mechanically the same whatever the system) to
test for similar weaknesses through other vectors.
• Finally, there are concerns with generalisation of a system since testing tends to rely
on implementation. However, as automotive production lines are standardised, we
reasonably assume that if the Bluetooth stack in a vehicle is ﬂawed in some way, this
same vulnerability may appear in some other vehicle of same age, make, model and
software version (of which there may be millions). Furthermore, reuse is a common
approach to reducing cost in the industry [44], and as such ﬂaws could be replicated
even in newer models. Even vulnerabilities that have been patched in more modern
embedded systems may be present in newer vehicles, as software in an automotive
system is updated less frequently [40].
The preliminary round of data gathering (results of which are in Section 5) from all test
systems was conducted using the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES), which
is not a formal standard but rather a set of guidelines to provide an outline of the process.
Formal technical standards do exist [1], however, the primary barrier to adopting them is
the high information needs about the testing environment [27].
Recall that results are deterministic based on implementation, conﬁguration and state.
Despite this, results can neither be predicted nor calculated when a black box perspective
is employed. Therefore all experimentation is empirical. Nonetheless, there is value in car-
rying out such research. The list of vulnerabilities may be unenumerable, but corrective
action to address an observed vulnerability would reduce that list by one, whilst also pro-
viding the owner of the system with information for improvements and veriﬁcation of current
conﬁgurations.
5. Proof-of-concept tool
The proof-of-concept tool created to carry out the steps as detailed in the sample attack
tree is an extension of the concepts embodied by various other proof-of-concept, pre-alpha
and beta Bluetooth security testing tools created since 2003. Some examples include redfang
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[54] (a proof-of-concept tool created in 2003 for brute-scanning), CarWhisperer [41] (a small
tool created in 2005 to scan for manufacturers that implement hardcoded PINs and use that
to connect to and inject audio into or record audio from a vehicle), or Bluesnarfer [35] (a tool
created to exploit a vulnerability discovered in 2003, using AT commands in order to extract
phonebooks from susceptible mobile phones). The most recent release of nOBEX [39] can
be construed as one of the most relevant as it is directed at automotive headunits. However,
functionality is currently limited to fuzzing and they make no claims as to automation.
The tool itself depends on the oﬃcial Linux Bluetooth stack (called Bluez [5]) to provide
the Bluetooth functionality needed to test these interfaces. It was developed using Python
2.7 on a Kali Linux system using the the Bluetooth Python extension module Pybluez [24].
The tree structure and the tree search facility is enabled by the treelib library [12].
Table 2: Bluetooth tool veriﬁcation (identifying information has been redacted)
Device Characteristics
1
Bluetooth address: XX:XX:XX:93:94:07
Bluetooth version 4.0 on Android 5.1, service proﬁles obtained
Filesystem is mountable and browsable, ﬁle transfer possible assuming pairing and
connection, responds to AT commands assuming user gives permission on the appro-
priate channels.
2
Bluetooth address: XX:XX:XX:40:41:47
Bluetooth version 2.1 on BlackberryOS 7.1, service proﬁles obtained
No OBEX File Transfer Proﬁle (FTP) for mounting or ﬁle transfer. Responds to
OBEX object push commands and AT commands assuming user gives permission on
the appropriate channels
3
Bluetooth address: XX:XX:XX:4A:19:80
Bluetooth version 4.0 on Windows Phone 8.0, service proﬁles obtained
No OBEX FTP. Responds to OBEX object push commands and AT commands as-
suming user gives permission on the appropriate channels
Many of the pre-built tools found were singular in nature, essentially providing only
a single aspect of testing (such as spooﬁng, perhaps leading to MITM). Furthermore, the
majority are now archived or unsupported and dependent on deprecated libraries. This
necessitated the creation of a new tool incorporating many diﬀerent functions in order to
facilitate systematism.
The proof-of-concept tool presented in this paper follows a predeﬁned attack tree in order
to complete a penetration test. Note that some aspects of the attack tree are diﬃcult to
carry out practically (as is the case with actions involving social engineering), and there
are some assumptions in order to facilitate development; that the Bluetooth systems are
discoverable (as brute scanning is impractical) and that a connection is possible. The tool
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during development stages was then tested on a variety of multiple older mobile platforms
to verify functionality (Table 2).
The predeﬁned sample tree (Figure 3) concentrates on data extraction as an attack goal
and is used as an input into the tool constructed (Algorithm 1). This process travels down
each node of the tree, until it reaches the leaves, and depending on the logic gate, carries
out the necessary testing steps, recording and outputting data to the appropriate test run.
Algorithm 1: Data extraction via the Bluetooth interface. Vehicle data refers to any data
that is available from the vehicle, including personal data, vehicle-generated data, or data
about the vehicle itself.
input : Predeﬁned attack tree
output: Vehicle data
initialization;
for AttackGoal do
foreach AttackTreeBranch in order do
foreach AttackTreeLeaf do
if AttackTreeLeaf is OR then
while attack fails do
AttackSteps on vehicle;
end
Record vehicle data;
if no vehicle data then
Display AttackSteps and AttackTreeLeaf;
else
Populate AttackTreeLeaf with vehicle data;
end
else
perform all AttackSteps;
Record vehicle data;
if no vehicle data then
Display parent nodes with children for AttackSteps;
else
Populate AttackTreeLeaf with vehicle data;
end
end
end
end
for AttackTreeLeaf do
if has vehicle data then
for AttackTreeLeaf do
Display AttackTreeBranch;
end
else
for Empty AttackTreeLeaf do
Display AttackSteps;
end
end
end
end
11
Figure 3: Textual representation of a sample attack tree based on data extraction as an attacker goal
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5.1. Automation
The features of the tool (Table 3) can be categorised broadly into:
• Reconnaissance, which can be deﬁned as a survey of the system’s existence, conﬁg-
uration and capabilities,
• Connection attributes, which includes information on pairing mechanisms, trans-
mission sizes and connection state, and
• Attack goal (data extraction), which encompasses methods that would allow the
realisation of the attack goal
The tool is semi-automated (Table 3), in that many aspects of the test suite does not re-
quire manual intervention. This is true of the majority of the reconnaissance and connection
attribute determination features where the tool will run down the tree on its own should all
data be available. If data is not available for a particular branch, the steps (i.e. the subtree)
that would need to be completed would be displayed for possible manual intervention.
Some manual decision making is required when performing the data extraction tests.
Whilst the individual attack methods (such as sending in AT commands) can be auto-
mated, full automation of multiple types of attacks in sequence is diﬃcult in this case as the
target system is a black box, and the search for weaknesses in such an environment comes
with a large number of sequential decision making issues [21]. This is in addition to un-
certainties around what could be construed as an attacker’s “point-of-view” (the paradigm
of penetration testing) and interconnection between diﬀerent attack components [21] when
testing a system.
A key consideration during conception and development of the tool was the choice of
nodes to automate. There were some aspects where non-trivial development was required,
when it would have been simpler to observe the target device (such as which of four SSP
mechanisms is in use during pairing), and others where manual intervention was required
as the information is generally held physically. An example of the latter is the device’s
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ID, which provides valuable information on
the attributes of wireless communications, and is usually printed on a physical label.
In summary, the tool, whilst being only semi-automated, provides a head start with
regards to establishing the security state baseline for the target system. Furthermore, the
attack tree methodology underlying the tool also provides for a traceable and systematic set
of results.
5.2. Tool validation
The tool was tested against ﬁve diﬀerent vehicles (of diﬀerent makes, models and ages),
all of which were registered within the last ﬁve years. There was no additional source of
information regarding the Bluetooth implementation on these systems, other than what was
publicly available through the owner’s manuals. Due to commercial sensitivity, identifying
information has been redacted. Results of tests on vehicles are summarised in Table 4.
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Table 3: Tool Features (corresponds to AttackSteps in Algorithm 1)
Feature Automation stage
R
ec
o
n
n
a
is
sa
n
ce
Discovery of ‘discoverable’ device addresses using inquiry
scans
Automated
Discovery of ‘hidden’ devices using brute-force scanning Automated
Determination of Bluetooth chip manufacturer using the
organisationally unique ID (OUI) to scan through a
database of stored OUIs
Automated
Determination of service proﬁles oﬀered by device using
the Service Discovery Protocol (SDP)
Automated
Preliminary indication of device operating system (OS)
using indicators in discovered service proﬁles
Semi-automated (may require manual
search from other sources)
Determination of whether device uses legacy pairing by
checking the Bluetooth version
Semi-automated (a Bluetooth version
of 2.0 or below indicates legacy pairing)
Determination of open ports by sending information to
all possible RFCOMM and L2CAP ports and awaiting
responses
Automated
Determination of ﬁltered ports by sending information to
all RFCOMM and L2CAP pors and ﬁltering for speciﬁc
error messages
Automated
C
o
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
A
tt
ri
bu
te
s
Determination of pairing status with reference to local
paired devices
Automated
Pair or unpair the device as appropriate with reference to
local paired devices
Semi-automated (the user decides to
pair or unpair)
Checks for presence of OBEX File Transfer Proﬁle (FTP)
and OBEX Object Push Proﬁle (OPP) service with refer-
ence to discovered service proﬁles
Automated
Checks maximum transmission unit (MTU) for open
L2CAP ports by sending increasing size of packets until
Bluetooth error 90 (’message too long’) appears
Automated
D
a
ta
E
xt
ra
ct
io
n
Attempted extraction of information using modem atten-
tion (AT) commands through open RFCOMM ports
Semi-automated (open ports are au-
tomatically determined and AT com-
mands can be sent in, but user chooses
the commands).
Attempted extraction of information by mounting and
browsing the ﬁlesystem on a FUSE based ﬁlesystem type
Semi-automated (checks for
OBEXFTP proﬁle automatically,
tries to mount automatically, but user
does the manual browsing if successful)
Attempted extraction of information using OBEX GET
and PUT commands
Semi-automated (checks for open RF-
COMM ports automatically, user is
given choice of commands)
O
u
tp
u
ts
Scan logs written to .csv or .txt ﬁles and collated at the
end of test run
Automated
Populated attack tree displayed and logged Automated
Subtrees displayed and logged where test results have not
been found or entered. This is denoted by NULL. Appro-
priate subtrees are found using width-ﬁrst search.
Automated
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Table 4: Practical testing on built-in infotainment systems in test vehicles
Interface characteristics Outcome
BT address, version and class
XX:XX:XX:34:8A:2D
Bluetooth v. 2.0 , 0x340408 (AV, Hands-free)
Pairing mechanism
Legacy: vehicle produces dynamic 6 digit PIN
Services
HFP, SyncML Server, A2DP, AVRCP, PBAP
(Client), OBEX OPP, MAP MNS
Open ports (when paired)
RFCOMM 1, 4 and L2CAP 1, 3
User feedback
Audio and visual notice of successful pairing,
device added to paired list. User is not alerted
to any of the attempted actions beyond pairing
Actions and results
Responds to AT commands on RFCOMM
channel 4 with “AT+BRSF=39”, vehicle
ignores commands on all other channels (no
response from vehicle), ignores OBEX PUT,
OBEX GET and SyncML client. Filesystem
cannot be mounted
BT address, version and class
XX:XX:XX:6E:DC:D5
Bluetooth v. 2.0 , 0x340408 (AV, Hands-free)
Pairing mechanism
Legacy: user chooses number of digits as PIN
Services
SPP, OBEX OPP, OBEX FTP, IrMC Sync,
HFP, HSG, PANU
User feedback
Visual change informing user that PIN should
be chosen, no alert that pairing was successful
or that there were attempted connections.
Remote device not added to paired devices
list
Actions and results
Could pair but not connect; port scan could
not be performed. All actions beyond recon-
naissance ended in error
BT address, version and class
XX:XX:XX:CF:69:B8
Bluetooth v 2.1 , 0x340408 (AV, Hands-free)
Pairing mechanism
SSP - Numeric comparison, however vehicle
reported pairing with default PIN of ’0000’
with SSP disabled on test adaptor.
Services
HFP, AVRCP, A2DP, PBAP (Client), MAP
MNS, OBEX OPP
Open ports (when paired)
RFCOMM 1,2,3,4,5 and L2CAP 1
User feedback
Numeric comparison proceeded as normal.
Pairing using 0000 created a very brief visual
alert, device added to paired devices list.
No other alert was issued for subsequent
actions performed on vehicle
Actions and results
Bluetooth error 104 (connection reset by peer)
on all open channels for AT commands is-
sued. Ignores OBEX PUT and GET. Filesys-
tem cannot be mounted
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Interface characteristics (continued) Outcome (continued)
BT address, version and class
XX:XX:XX:8A:81:20
Bluetooth v. 2.0 , 0x300408 (AV, Hands-free)
Pairing mechanism
Legacy: user chooses number of digits as PIN
Services
PBAP (Client), AVRCP, OBEX OPP,
SyncML Server, HFP
Open ports (when paired)
RFCOMM 1, 4 and L2CAP 1, 23
User feedback
Visual change informing user that PIN should
be chosen, visual alert informing of successful
pairing. Remote device added to paired
devices list.
Actions and results
Only an unstable connection to vehicle
Bluetooth system given. Vehicle responded
to SyncML client on test device requesting
for contact synchronisation and established
a session. However, the session ended before
any information came through as connection
terminated. AT commands were ignored (no
response from vehicle) on open channels.
BT address, version and class
XX:XX:XX:C3:4A:64
Bluetooth v2.0 , 0x340408 (AV, Hands-free)
Pairing mechanism
Legacy: 4 digit PIN, default 0000
Services
HSG, Sync, HFP, OBEX OPP, Update,
Vendor speciﬁc SPP1, Vendor speciﬁc SPP2,
PBAP (Client), A2DP, AVRCP, OBEX FTP,
PANU
Open ports (when paired)
RFCOMM 3,4,5,8,9,10,11,12 and L2CAP 1,
15, 25, 27
User feedback
Small visual alert in secondary screen above
steering wheel, no alert from main screen.
No ﬂags or alerts for all subsequent actions.
Device added to paired devices list.
Actions and results
AT commands are ignored (no response from
vehicle), except on channel 5 where no infor-
mation is returned. Filesystem is mountable
on a FUSE based ﬁlesystem and browsable.
Two folders were found: “recorder” and “up-
date ftp”. It is unclear what the purpose and
permissions of these folders are. No response
to OBEX GET or PUT.
6. Discussion and conclusions
To eﬀectively enumerate the security state of the automotive Bluetooth interface, we
used the structured form of the attack tree to carry out a penetration test, based on data
extraction as a goal.
6.1. Pairing and connection
Four out of the ﬁve vehicles used the legacy pairing mechanism exclusively. The third
vehicle tested used SSP (Numeric Comparison), however, disabling SSP on the local test
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laptop meant that pairing could occur using ’0000’. This conﬁrms that, even with relatively
modern vehicles, older technologies are still in use and could therefore be vulnerable to
eavesdropping and MITM attacks. Even where the newer SSP pairing mechanism is in use,
bypassing such measures were straightforward because of the weakness of the default PIN.
The number of open ports is usually dependent on whether a user is paired or connected
to the vehicle, however, the OBEX OPP proﬁle remained open regardless. Although data
extraction through this port was unsuccessful, techniques such as repeated pushing of ﬁles
through this port could help fulﬁll alternative attack goals (such as denial of service).
Vehicles universally reconnected with the test laptop as soon as it came into range, the
ramiﬁcation of which is that an attacker would only need to compromise the pairing process
once. The pairing process diﬀered (at least mechanically) on the vehicles tested, with some
generating PINs, others with hardcoded PINs, and still others asking the users to select the
PIN. The window in which a vehicle remains discoverable also varied. Out of the ﬁve, three
vehicles had a two minute window, which limits attacker opportunity. The other two held
the discoverable window open indeﬁnitely, which leaves the vehicle open to opportunistic
adversaries.
6.2. User feedback
All of these vehicles do not alert the user as to any actions taken during an active
connection. Thus, AT requests, ﬁlesystem mounting, synchronisation commands, OBEX
PUSH and GET commands all took place without any visual or aural warning; the limitation
of ﬁnding a Bluetooth address aside, should the user be unaware that a pairing or connection
had taken place, an adversary could carry out many of these attacks unnoticed. Additionally,
although at this point in time data extraction was the focus, there were open ports even
where a pairing had not taken place. The danger in this is the ability to ﬂood these ports
with data thereby, potentially, causing a denial of service. Although this was not performed
as the focus was on data extraction, the details of this would certainly be included in any
future attack tree involving denial of service as an attack goal.
6.3. System weaknesses
An interesting ﬁnding was the ability to mount a ﬁlesystem with full read and partial
write access (in that directories could be written, but not ﬁles); through this entry point,
any number of crafted applications could be placed on to the vehicle to disrupt operations.
Fuzzing here (such as directory names containing non-standard characters) could also reveal
more about this feature.
There were also vendor speciﬁc proﬁles found on the last of the vehicles in Table 4. They
appear to be serial port proﬁles, although its functionality would need to be probed further.
AT commands elicited Bluetooth error 104 (connection reset by peer), but future work may
include traﬃc sniﬃng and analysis during normal course of operations which might yield
more information.
Since hands-free phone calls are one of the more prominent features of Bluetooth in
vehicles, it was unsurprising to see the Phone Book Access Proﬁle (PBAP) on some of the
vehicles. This allows phonebooks to be synchronised from a mobile phone (or other device
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holding a phonebook in the correct format) to the vehicle. The ‘client’ status denotes that
this only goes one way, from the remote device to the vehicle, however, tools such as nOBEX
could be used to fuzz this particular feature by uploading contacts or phone numbers that
have non-standard characters, or are past a certain length.
Another feature of interest was that a synchronisation proﬁle (SyncML Server, Sync,
IrMC Sync) was present in all but one of these vehicles. These synchronisation proﬁles are
generally used to synchronise phonebooks and other personal information between phone
and vehicle. Although there was no personal data extracted, in at least one instance, a
connection (albeit unstable) with a SyncML client was established; the setup could be
revised to try and correct for this and verify whether any data could be extracted.
The last point of interest was the presence of the Personal Ad-Hoc Network User (PANU)
proﬁle on two of the vehicles. This service is able to transfer Ethernet packets across a
connection. There are three security modes used by this proﬁle. The ﬁrst is “non-secure”,
where a device does not initiate any security procedures. The second is service-level enforced
security, where security procedures are not initiated before a channel is established at L2CAP
level. Lastly, the link-level enforced security mode initiates security procedures before the
link set-up at the Link Management Protocol (LMP) layer [3]. LMP controls the radio link
between two devices. The mode used by the PANU proﬁle in this case is so far unenumerated,
but represents a potential alternative method to send in (Ethernet) packets that could
compromise a vehicle.
6.4. Limitations
Despite the fact that the class of device was set to that of a smartphone with telephony
features (0x5a020c or 0x7a020c), the vehicles universally recognised the test laptop as a
media player rather than a phone. This meant that certain features (such as phonebook)
were unavailable when interacting with the vehicular user interface. However, the version
of Bluez (5.37) used in this paper does not support the Bluetooth hands-free proﬁle (HFP),
which may explain the discrepancy, and future work would require repeating the tests on a
downgraded version in order to verify this. This may also be the reason behind being unable
to connect to one of the vehicles.
Five vehicles is also a small number to test, but the case could be built further by testing
a wider range and larger number in order to help further verify and validate what has already
been acquired.
It should be noted also that quantitative metrics at this point in time is outside of
scope, as detection measures of intrusion within a vehicle are at a nascent stage at best,
and “known” vulnerabilities are generally based on inference from other applications of
Bluetooth. Additionally, practical testing is concentrated on built-in systems as aftermarket
“car kits” diﬀer in that they would not usually have connection to the in-vehicle network
and, in this piece of work, could be considered a lower priority at this point in time.
6.5. Conclusions
From our ﬁndings, we conclude that there are multiple weaknesses in a vehicle that
could be exploited, and that consideration should be given by vehicle manufacturers as to
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how legacy pairing could be replaced, as well as how visible interactions with the vehicle
should be. We also conclude that these possible vulnerabilities were found by following the
structured procedure presented in this paper, and we were able to test them to build a
security case. Whilst no personal data was found in the exploration of these vehicles, there
was data from the vehicle itself. Additionally, the method is extensible with the addition
of other attack goals, and could be used to test other potential weaknesses such as open
ports when unpaired. Along with the above, we have also gained some insight into and
established a security state baseline of the implementation and conﬁguration of Bluetooth
within the vehicle. This allows us to edge towards a stage where we could build a model for
more rigorous tests, such as model-based testing.
Mitigating the vulnerability found in one branch may also cancel out other branches
where attack paths are not so easily tested. For example, mounting an operating system
could be performed using a legitimate device, or by acquiring a phone through social engi-
neering - negating the ability to mount an operating system would close oﬀ both pathways.
We envision that this tool would help manufacturers both in evaluating current implemen-
tations and using the results to help secure future iterations of designs.
7. Future work
The sample tree presented only represents one of the three categories of attack goals
planned, with the other two being denial of service and data manipulation. At the heart of
the framework is the initial reconnaissance of any test interface, and which forms the basis
for all future vulnerability hypotheses and threat models. Although there is a myriad of
tools available, the information they provide collectively is scattered at best, and a method
of bringing these together in a coherent format would be desirable. To further this, we would
extend and create new attack trees to include other goals, along with tests on a wider range
of vehicles, with multiple versions of the Linux Bluetooth stack in order to correct for any
setup issues.
Looking further into the future, an in-depth analysis of the operating system would also
help deﬁne how this module interacts with the backbone Controller Area Network (CAN)
bus that controls vehicle operations. The work so far (which only looks at the entry point and
the Bluetooth feature) will thus form a stepping stone into research on possible disruptions
on vehicle operations from an external source.
We aspire to use the work here to harden future systems by generating and incorporating
security speciﬁc requirements from the results of the systematic security evaluation into
future designs [10]. We also envision that further testing would provide more insight into
how components behave, which would enable us to start the process of building a trustworthy
model that could be used in more rigorous processes such as model based security testing.
Wireless connectivity is only increasing, both in the number and variety of interfaces and
protocols used as well as bandwidth capacities. Going forward to where vehicles become
“smarter” and highly automated [9], the need to evaluate the security of wireless connections
will never be less than essential.
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